

It was still diving when both torpedoes struck home.
The Wahoo fired two more torpedoes and dove to avoid another attack. Imperial Japanese Navy tankers steam in a convoy in World War II. In doing so, the transport presented the sub with its broad sides, a prime target. Morton ordered a risky gambit, firing a torpedo at the transport after it drew close rather than taking evasive actions.Īfter the torpedo was launched, the transport took its own evasive action and abandoned its ramming maneuver. The troop transport attempted a ram, sailing straight at the Wahoo. Wahoo then turned its attention to the tanker and the troop transport. The first target sank and the second was wounded. The sub fired a four-torpedo spread at the two freighters, scoring three hits. There was no escort, but the Wahoo still had to watch for enemy deck guns and ramming maneuvers. The USS Wahoo was one of the most successful and famous submarines in World War II, but it wouldn’t survive the war. All four were valuable targets, but sinking the troop transport could save thousands of lives and sinking tankers would slow the Japanese war machine by starving ships of fuel. They found a four-ship convoy consisting of a tanker, a troop transport, and two freighters. Just over an hour after sunrise, the third officer spotted smoke over the horizon and Morton ordered an intercept course. 26 would be the Wahoo’s date with destiny. Dudley Morton ordered a crash dive immediately after firing, putting as much water in the way of enemy depth charges as possible.īut the last torpedo swam true and hit the Japanese ship in the middle, breaking its keel and causing its boilers to burst. The risk of failure was so great that Lt.

(Photo: Public Domain)Īt 800 yards they fired their sixth and last forward torpedo, barely enough range for the torpedo to arm. Destroyers are relatively small and weak ships, but are well-suited to destroying submarines and protecting friendly ships. The Imperial Japanese Navy destroyer Hayate undergoes sea trials in 1925. When the destroyer reached 1,200 yards, the crew fired the fifth torpedo, which the destroyer again avoided. The crew played a high-stakes game of chicken by holding the sub in position. The Wahoo fired another torpedo with the speed taken into account, but the destroyer turned out of the weapon’s path.Īnd then it bore down on the Wahoo, seeking to destroy the American sub. It fired a spread of three torpedoes but had underestimated the destroyer’s speed. During the reconnaissance mission, the sailors spotted a destroyer in the water.įlush with torpedoes and no other threats in sight, the Wahoo decided to engage. 24 when the sub was mapping a forward Japanese base on a small island near Papua New Guinea. Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers.(Video: YouTube/ Smithsonian Channel)For the crew of the Wahoo, their great victory came in the middle of five tense days of fighting. is available online at: ĭegree preferences graphic sequences Markov process stationary distribution Nash equilibrium Game theoretical modelling of a dynamically evolving network I: general target sequences. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Broom, M.
#Target broom pdf
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Dynamics and Games following peer review. We prove some general results and then consider a single example in depth. This is more realistic and makes a significant difference to the model, one consequence of which is that the analysis is much more complicated. This builds on previous work where individuals tried to optimise their number of connections by forming or breaking random links the difference being that here we introduce a truly game-theoretic version where they can choose which specific links to form/break. In this paper we introduce a game-theoretical model of a population where the individuals have an optimal level of social engagement, and form or break social relationships strategically to obtain the correct level. These actions are often not random, but chosen strategically. Animal (and human) populations contain a finite number of individuals with social and geographical relationships which evolve over time, at least in part dependent upon the actions of members of the population.
